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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH#
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 870306

vs.
Priority 1

STEVEN RAY JAMES,
Defendant-Appellant.

JUPIgDJCTjQN ANP NATURE QF THE CASE
This is an interlocutory appeal from pretrial orders in
a capital homicide case charged in the First District Court.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code
Ann. S 77-35-26 (2)(c)(Supp. 1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether defendant's right to a fair trial will be

jeopardized by the use of a prior conviction as an aggravating
circumstance to be proven in the guilt phase of his trial for
first degree murder.
2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

denying defendant's pretrial motion for a change of venue where
the motion was premature because defendant presented no evidence
that the potential jurors have been exposed to the allegedly
prejudicial media coverage and where extensive voir dire of
potential jurors is a viable means to uncover any potential
prejudice.

3.

Whether defendant may raise for the first time in

his brief on this discretionary appeal, the trial court's denial
of his pretrial motion for a survey of a random sample of the
residents of Cache and Box Elder counties at county expense where
he did not request permission to appeal this issue*
Alternatively, whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying defendant's motion when the trial court offered to permit
extensive voir dire of a large pool of potential jurors*
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant is charged with the first degree murder of
his son in the First District Court, Cache County, State of Utah.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
aggravating circumstance supporting the first degree murder
charge and a motion for a change of venue due to prejudicial
pretrial publicity.

Judge VeNoy Christofferson denied these

motions.
Defendant petitioned this Court for permission to
appeal the interlocutory orders on the motion to dismiss the
aggravating circumstance and the motion for a change of venue.
The State concurred in the petition and this Court granted the
interlocutory appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State agrees with the statement of facts set out in
defendant's brief.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Defendants prior conviction for a crime of

violence is an element of first degree murder and there is no
constitutional infirmity in admitting this evidence to prove an
element of the crime. Defendants fear of prejudice can be
adequately protected by a cautionary jury instruction.
2.

Defendants motion for a change of venue due to

pretrial publicity was properly denied because it was premature.
The test is whether any of the actual jurors are actually
irrevocably prejudiced against defendant and unable to give him a
fair trial. Until the potential jurors are questioned, the trial
court acted reasonably in denying the motion.
3.

Surveys of the community at large are not

necessarily accurate predictions of the ability to provide
defendant with a fair trial. Moreover# the trial court did not
deny the motion but told defendant that he could present further
evidence in support of it and, therefore, there is no final order
from which defendant may appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE CHARGED UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-202(1)(h) IS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND WILL NOT DENY DEFENDANT
HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
Defendant is charged with murder in the first degree in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202(1) (Supp. 1987) in that he
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of his son, Steven
Ray James, and that he was previously convicted of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to a person.
-3-

Defendant

complains on appeal that S 76-5-202(1) (h) will interfere with his
constitutional right to a fair trial.

Specifically, defendant

argues that notice of prior convictions read to a jury as part of
the charging information before presentation of any evidence will
be prejudicial because of the tendency of the jury to convict
because he is a 'bad person1 rather than because he is proved
guilty of Capital Homicide.
Section 76-5-202(1)(h) provides that:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in
the first degree if the actor intentionally
or knowingly causes the death of another
under any of the following circumstances:
(h) The actor was previously convicted of
first or second degree murder or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to a
person. For the purpose of this paragraph an
offense committed in another jurisdiction,
which if committed in Utah would be
punishable as first or second degree murder,
is deemed first or second degree murder.
Thus, a prior conviction of first or second degree murder or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person is an
element of first degree murder.
The purpose of subsection (h) is stated simply in the
commentary to the Model Penal Code:
Perhaps the strongest popular demand for
capital punishment arises where the defendant
has a history of violence. Prior conviction
of a felony involving violence to the person
suggests two inferences supporting escalation
of sentence: first, that the murder reflects
the character of the defendant rather than
any extraordinary aspect of the situation,
and second, that the defendant is likely to
prove dangerous to life on some future
occasion. Thus, prior conviction of a
violent felony is included as a circumstance
that may support imposition of the death
penalty.

-4-

Model Penal Code § 210.6 commentary at 136 (1980)
The State acknowledges that evidence of prior crimes is
generally presumed prejudicial and "absent a reason for the
admission of the evidence other than to show criminal
disposition, the evidence is excluded."
P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).

State v. Saunders, 699

However, "[elvidence of prior crimes

is admissible if the evidence is relevant to prove a specific
element of the crime for which a defendant is on trial."
v, Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192, 195 (1985), cert, denied,
107 S. Ct. 64 (1986).

State
U.S.

,

Where the Legislature has chosen to have

the jury consider the circumstances in the guilt phase of the
trial, this Court should find that the statute is constitutional
since the Legislature has the duty to define crimes.

State v.

Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 36-7 (Feb. 3, 1988).
Defendant relies upon three Utah cases wherein this
Court found that due process was violated where the jury was
allowed to consider prejudicial prior conviction evidence; e.g.,
State Vt geunflerSr 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985); State v. McCumber,
622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980); State v. Gottfrey. 598 P.2d
1979).

1325 (Utah

However, in none of those cases, unlike the present case,

was a prior conviction an element of the crime with which the
defendant was charged.

Because defendants conviction involving

a crime of violence is an element of first degree murder, a valid
reason exists for admission of the evidence, and the cases cited
by defendant are simply inapplicable.
Defendant claims that Utah is the only state which
permits the use of prior convictions to be considered as an

-5-

aggravating circumstance in the guilt phase of a capital trial.
Howeverf both Alabama and Oregon provide for the use of prior
convictions in the guilt phase of a capital trial.
Ala. Code S 13A-5-40(a)(13) (1975) provides:
(a) The following are capital offenses: • • •
(13) Murder by a defendant who has been
convicted of any other murder in the 20 years
preceding the crime; . . . .
In Arthur v. State, 472 So. 2d 650 (Ala. Cr. App.
1985), overruled on other grounds. 472 So. 2d 665 (Ala. 1985),
the defendant complained that the inclusion of a prior offense as
an element of first degree murder violated due process of law.
The Arthur court stated that:
Statutes which enhance the sentence are
not violative of the due process clause, and
do not create an unreasonable classification.
The statute was obviously enacted with a view
to the protection of society from a certain
class of criminal with the belief that a
hardened criminal needed more severe
punishment • • • •
Furthermore, the section does not
deprive the appellant of due process of law
because it requires the use of a prior
conviction in the indictment • • • •
Moreover, the aggravating circumstances
constitute an element of the capital offense
and are required to be averred in the
indictment, and must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. The aggravating
circumstances must be set forth in the
indictment because the State is required to
give the accused notice that a greater
penalty is sought to be inflicted than for a
first offense.
(citations omitted).

I£. at 657-58.

Or. Rev. Stat. S 163.095(1)(c) (Repl. 1985) provides
that the crime is aggravated murder if:

-6-

"[t]he defendant committed murder after
having been convicted previously in any
jurisdiction of any homicide, the elements of
which constitute the crime of murder as
defined in ORS 163.115 or manslaughter in the
first degree as defined in ORS 163.118."
In State v. Earp, 69 Or. App. 365, 686 P.2d 437 (1984),
cert, denied 691 P.2d 483 (Or. 1984), the defendant argued that
the court erred in admitting evidence of his previous conviction
to prove murder in the first degree.

The court stated that:

[i]t is apparent that, in order to prove
defendant's guilt of aggravated murder in
this case, it was necessary to prove
defendant's prior conviction for first degree
murder. Thus, evidence of the prior crime is
not only relevant it is material to proof of
the crime charged, and was not introduced to
show defendant's criminal propensity.
Although the prejudicial impact on a
defendant in a murder case of having the
jurors know that he committed first degree
murder previously is strong, the defendant
may avoid that problem by stipulating to the
prior conviction* • • • •
Earp. 686 P.2d at 439.
The Earp court further relied upon the holding in
Soencer v. Texas. 385 U.S. 554 (1967) wherein the defendant
claimed that admission of the prior conviction during the guilt
determination phase of the trial offended the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of due process:
The Supreme Court rejected the
contention, stating that the admission of
that type of evidence could be justified by
the State's valid governmental interest in
enforcing greater penalties against habitual
* Oregon statutory law provides that the defendant has the choice
of stipulating to the existence of his prior conviction or of
having evidence of that conviction admitted in evidence. See Or.
Rev. Stat S 163.103 (Repl. 1985).
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offenders and that the jury is expected to
follow limiting instructions. The court
recognized that there might be other less
intrusive ways of enforcing enhanced penalty
provisions, such as a bifurcated trial, but
stated that the failure to adopt an
alternative procedure did not change the
constitutional result.
EALB. 686 P.2d at 440.2

See also State v. Danielson, 719 P.2d 44

(Or. App. 1986), cert, denied 723 P.2d 325 (Or. 1986)
(reaffirming Earp)•
Defendant argues that the only remedy for the alleged
prejudicial effect of this evidence is reduction of his charge to
second degree murder.

On the contrary, there are alternative

remedies that will protect defendant from the potential prejudice
he fears while protecting the valid state interest in enhancing
the degree of the crime for persons who have previously
demonstrated violent behavior and who have failed to conform
their behavior to the law after their prior experience with the
judicial system.
First, the jury may be instructed that defendant's
prior conviction may only be considered as aggravation and not
proof that defendant murdered his son.

They may be specifically

admonished not to consider the fact of his prior conviction
unless they first find that he intentionally and knowingly killed
his son.

2 it is interesting to
Marshall v. Lonberger,
cited by defendant for
addressing the present

note that Spencer was reaffirmed in
459 U.S. 422, 438, n. 6 (1983), a case
the proposition that no cases exist
issue.
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In an analogous setting the Court of Appeals of
Washingtonf in State v. Lindamood, 39 Wash. App. 517, 693 P.2d
753 (1985), considered the potential impact on a jury of
admission of a prior conviction for burglary.

Defendant was

charged with first degree murder with burglary as an aggravating
circumstance.
admitted.

At trial, his recent conviction for burglary was

The Court held there was very little likelihood that

the jury would be influenced by the prior conviction when
deciding the issue of premeditation in a murder case.
Defendant further argues that his prior conviction is
inadmissible under the rules of evidence and State v. Banney. 717
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986).

His argument is inapplicable because the

prior conviction is not offered to impeach defendants
credibility under Rule 609, but to prove an element of firstdegree murder.

It is also not offered under any of the

circumstances governed by Rule 404.

Simply, defendant's prior

conviction will not be presented to the jury to show his
character in order to prove that he committed the act charged,
but merely to elevate the degree of the offense.

A cautionary

instruction will eliminate the potential for prejudice that
defendant fears.
Alternatively, if this Court finds that admission of
the evidence will unfairly prejudice defendant even with a
cautionary instruction, defendant could stipulate to the
aggravating circumstance of a prior conviction of a crime of
violence in exchange for the State not offering the prior
conviction at the guilt phase, except as impeachment.

•9-

Such an

approach has been adopted in Oregon.

In State v. Earp, 69 Or.

Ap. 365, 686 P.2d 437 (1984), the defendant was charged with
aggravated murder based on a prior conviction for homicide.
Similar to Utah's scheme, the Oregon statute requires proof of
the prior conviction as an element of aggravated murder.

In

addition, the Oregon law permits the defendant to stipulate to
the prior conviction which would not then be revealed to the jury
at trial.
Notably, in Earp* the defendant refused to stipulate to
his prior conviction and it was admitted at trial.

The Oregon

Court held that, although its admission might be prejudicial, the
prior conviction was an essential element of aggravated murder
that must be proven.

The Court stressed that Earp had the

opportunity to neutralize any potential prejudice by stipulating
to the fact of his prior conviction and preclude the jury from
hearing that evidence.
In the present case, if this Court is concerned about
the potential for prejudice arising from the introduction of
defendant's prior conviction, it may offer defendant the
compromise of a stipulation to his prior conviction.

Under that

circumstance, the State would agree not to offer any evidence at
the guilt phase regarding the prior conviction, except for
impeachment purposes.

The stipulation would take effect only if

the jury convicts defendant of an intentional and knowing murder.
At that point, the jury would be informed of the aggravating
circumstance of a prior conviction and would be asked to make a
finding consistent with the stipulation.
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While the State urges the Court to find that
introduction of defendants prior conviction as an element of the
crime will not unfairly prejudice him, if this Court determines
that neither a cautionary instruction nor a stipulation would
protect defendant from potential prejudice, this Court may adopt
a bifurcated approach under its general rulemaking authority
found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (1987), where the jury would not
initially be presented with evidence of defendant's prior
conviction.

See State v. Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 48-9 (Feb.

3, 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in result).

If the jury

finds defendant guilty of an intentional and knowing killing,
they may then be instructed on the aggravating circumstance and
return to deliberate its existence or nonexistence.
This approach would comport with the policy of this
Court to construe statutory provisions whenever possible to avoid
invalidating them on constitutional grounds. Greaves v. State,
528 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1974).

This Court has previously

acted to fill constitutional voids resulting from the enactment
of legislation which omitted certain key provisions fundamental
to the protection of a defendant's rights in a capital
proceeding.

In State v. Lafferty. 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 69 (Jan.

11, 1988), this Court imposed a requirement that juries be
instructed to find that previously uncharged crimes used at
penalty phase be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

In State v.

Hftfid, 649 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982), the Court construed § 76-3-207, to
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt at the penalty phase of a
capital case, even though no specific burden of persuasion had
been provided by the Legislature.
-11-

Finallyf defendant asserts that S 76-5-202(1)(h) limits
the use of a foreign conviction as an aggravating circumstance to
first or second degree murder.

Defendants interpretation

strains the plain meaning of the statute and does not comport
with sound public policy considerations.

The sentence to which

defendant refers appears merely to clarify that it is the Utah
definition of first and second degree murder that applies rather
than that of the foreign jurisdiction.

It in no way limits#

however, the aggravating circumstance in the way defendant
suggests.

It is the fact of defendant's previous violence and

previous opportunity to reform upon which the aggravation rests.
To hold that persons who have previously been convicted in
foreign jurisdictions of crimes of violence are less culpable
than persons convicted of the same crimes in Utah is illogical.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE.
Defendant asserts that the pretrial publicity in his
case has been so massive and prejudicial that it will
presumptively deny him an impartial jury.

He refers this Court

to a number of news articles and television reports to support
his argument.

Initially, it is important to note that the trial

court's ruling on this issue should be sustained unless it was an
abuse of discretion.
(Feb. 3, 1988).

State v. Bishop. 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 18

The trial court, however, properly exercised its

discretion in this case.
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The mere demonstration that some dissemination of news
thought to be prejudicial to a defendant has occurred does not
normally entitle him to prevail on a motion for change of venue.
State v, Lafferty. 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 63 (Jan. 11, 1988).
State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71, 89 (Utah 1982), cert- denied 459
U.S. 988 (1982); State v. Pierre. 572 P.2d 1338, 1349-50 (Utah
1977), cert, denied. 439 U.S. 882 (1978).

As noted in Wood:

"The mere general showing of publicity
thought to be adverse to a party is not
sufficient to require a change of venue
except in the most extraordinary cases. In
the usual situation, the movant must at least
make a showing that the allegedly prejudicial
material reached the veniremen, so that a
foundation is laid for the possibility of

actual bias." Northern California
Pharmaceutical Association Vt United states,
306 F.2d 379, 383 (9th Cir. 1962).
648 P.2d at 89 (footnote omitted).

In Codianna v. Morris* 660

P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983), the Court similarly observed:
An accused can be denied a fair trial
where the process of news-gathering is
allowed such a free rein that it intrudes
into every aspect of a trial and creates a
"carnival atmosphere" and where the publicity
is so weighted against the defendant and so
extreme in its impact that members of the
jury are encouraged to form strong
preconceived views of his guilt. Sheppard v.
Maxwell. 384 U.S. 333, 358, 86 S. Ct. 1507,
1519, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). Nevertheless,
"pretrial publicity—even pervasive, adverse
publicity—does not inevitably lead to an
unfair trial." Nebraska Press Association v.
SlUaUif 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S. Ct. 2791,
2800, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976).
660 P*2d at 1111.

And, the burden is on the defendant to show

that pretrial news coverage has generated community bias to such
a degree that the right to a fair and impartial trial has been
put in jeopardy.

Wood. 648 P.2d at 88; Utah R. Crim. P. 29(e)

(Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-29(e) (1982)).
-13-

The law concerning inherently prejudicial publicity was
largely developed in three major United States Supreme Court
decisions—Sheppard v. Maxwell. 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Est?S Vi
Texas. 381 U.S. 532 (1965); and Rideau v. Louisiana. 373 U.S. 723
(1963).

For example, in Sheppard the Court stated:
[Wlhere there is a reasonable likelihood that
prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent
a fair trial, the judge should . • . transfer
it to another county not so permeated with
publicity.

384 U.S. at 363.

In Pierre, this Court interpreted those cases:

Concerning Rideau. Estes and Sheppard. the
Supreme Court in Murphy v. Florida. 421 U.S.
794 at 799, 95 S. Ct. 2031, at 2036, 44
L.Ed.2d 589, said that these cases ". . .
cannot be made to stand for the proposition
that juror exposure to information about
. . . news accounts of the crime with which
he is charged alone presumptively deprives
the defendant of due process." Rather these
cases must be resolved taking the totality of
circumstances into account.
572 P.2d at 1349-50. For the same reasons the Court did not find
the refusal to order a change of venue in Pierre, a highly
publicized case, to be an abuse of discretion, the Court should
find no error here.

A review of this case leads one to the

identical conclusion that "this is not one of those exceptional
cases where pretrial publicity exacerbated by State complicity
encouraged the jurors to form such strong preconceived views of
defendant's guilt as to be considered inherently prejudicial
against him."

Ei£UL£# 572 P.2d at 1349. £££ alsQ CQdianna* 660

-14-

P.2d at 1112.3
Furthermore, Sheppard, £s£££, andftifleatiare all
distinguishable from the instant case.

In Sheppard the defendant

was examined for five hours without counsel during a three day
inquest televised live from a high school gymnasium; the three
Cleveland newspapers published the names and addresses of the
jurors exposing them to expressions of opinion from cranks and
friends; the prosecution made evidence available to the news
media which was inadmissible and never offered at trial, and even
the press in outside States made comments that it would be a
miracle if defendant could receive a fair trial in light of the
performance by the Cleveland press.

In Estes the two-day

pretrial hearing, the opening and closing arguments of the State,
and the return of the jury's verdict were all televised.

The

Esi££ Court was concerned about the impact of television on the

3 Nor does defendant's case represent the "unusual case" like,
for example, Pamplin v. Mason, 364 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), and
Maine v. Superior Court of Mendocino County, 68 Cal. 2d 375, 66
Cal. Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372 (1968) (both cited by this Court in
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d at 89 n. 21), where the courts
demonstrated an increased sensitivity to the effect of community
bias on the fairness of a trial. In Pamplin* the defendant was a
civil rights leader in a community of less than 30,000 who had
been charged with aggravated assault upon a local police officer
committed after he had been arrested in the first racial
demonstration ever staged in the community. There were definite
signs of an intense community hostility toward the defendant. In
MaiH£# the defendants were strangers in a small community; the
victims of the crime were prominent members of that community;
one of the victims was the object of community-wide concern and
interest; newspaper publicity included references to a purported
confession by one of the defendants; and finally, the two
opposing counsel were political opponents in an upcoming
election. Clearly, a cumulation of unusual circumstances
comparable to those in Pamplin and Mains, does not exist in the
community where defendant will be tried.
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jurors, on the testimony in the trial, and on the defendant.

The

Court also indicated that the presence of television placed
additional responsibilities on the Judge.

In Rideau a film of

defendant's confession was shown on television to approximately
106,000 viewers in a community with a population of approximately
150,000 people.
At the very least, defendant's motion is premature
since none of the actual potential jurors has been examined on
the issue.

The test is whether any jurors are actually

prejudiced against defendant by the media coverage, Bishop, 75
Utah Adv. Rep. at 19. The trial court generously offered to call
in a substantial pool from which to select a jury (T. dtd. 1-2987 at 17) and it is reasonable for the court to attempt to select
an impartial jury before ordering a change of venue.

Defendant

has not presented evidence that any or all of the potential
jurors actually viewed or heard the media coverage complained of.
Even if some potential jurors have formed opinions regarding
defendant's guilt, they would not necessarily be disqualified if
they are able to set those opinions aside and decide the case
based upon the evidence at trial. Lafferty. 73 Utah Adv. Rep. at
63.
In fact, defendant's own witnesses who appeared at the
hearing on the motion did not support defendant's claim.

Dr.

Pitkin admitted that, although he perceived prejudice in some of
the newscasts, he could not predict with certainty how any
particular individual would perceive them (T. dtd. 5-26-87 at
42).

Further, Ms. Hobbs, who testified about community efforts

-16-

to locate defendant's missing son, stated that she believed
defendant to be innocent until proven guilty.
Because the potential jurors have yet to be questioned
on the issue, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendants motion at this time. Defendant has not
established that he will not be able to select a fair, impartial
jury and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
POINT III
THIS COURT NEED NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S
ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
ALLOWED THE SURVEY BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT
REQUEST PERMISSION TO APPEAL THIS ISSUE.
Defendant filed a petition with this Court (R. 617-620)
requesting permission to appeal the trial court's orders denying
his motion to dismiss the aggravating circumstance and his motion
for a change of venue.

Defendant did not request in the petition

permission to appeal an order denying his request for a survey of
potential jurors.

In fact, there is no formal motion contained

in the record nor is there a final order contained in the record
denying such a motion although there is a transcript dated
January 29, 1987 wherein such a request was discussed.

Further,

Judge Christofferson indicated that he would not rule on such a
request until defendant had time to produce authority supporting
his request (T. dtd. 5/26/87 at 16-17, 27). Because there is no
final order denying permission for a survey and defendant did not
request permission to appeal from such an order, this Court
should not consider this issue,

gee South Salt Lake v. Burton,

718 P.2d 405 (Utah 1986) (unsigned minute entry not final order
for purposes of appeal).
-17-

Even if defendant had properly raised this issue, he
would not be entitled to relief in this Court.

Defendant

requested that he be allowed to conduct at county expense a poll
of a sample of the residents of Cache and Box Elder counties to
determine the general feelings of the community at large on the
subject of defendant's guilt or innocence or, at least, on the
subject of pretrial publicity.

Such a poll would not necessarily

have reflected the attitudes of the actual potential jurors to be
called in this case.
(Feb. 3, 1988).

State v. Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 18

What is relevant, are the prejudices and biases

of the actual jurors and not those of the community at large.
!£.

Only those jurors who hold opinions so strong that they are

unable to set those opinions aside are to be disqualified from
the jury.

Utah Code Ann. $ 77-35-18(e)(14) (1982).

Because

defendant's informal request was not aimed at reaching the
specific biases of the actual potential jurors, it would have
provided evidence of only minimal value to the trial court and it
was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the
request absent specific authority supporting it.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm the trial court's interlocutory orders and to remand
this case for an immediate trial on the merits.
DATED this 7 / /

day of

''I'/frtA

, 1988.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

SANDRA L. SJOGREN /
/
Assistant Attorney General
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